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This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance. Abstract 
Although codes of corporate governance have come to be widely used as a 
mode of regulating corporations, our understanding of how they function is still 
rather limited. In this paper we describe the design of such code regimes and 
propose a theoretical framework for studying their effects. On the basis of an 
observation-theoretical approach, codes are conceptualized as schemas of 
observation that determine the way we evaluate corporations. On the one hand, 
the effect of a code depends on the extent to which it becomes integrated into 
recursive cycles of mutual observation between the corporation and the various 
actors in the field. On the other hand, it also depends on how the code relates to 
other observational schemas in the field. The paper concludes with some 
guidelines for empirical research on code regimes. 
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Introduction 
 
In the wake of corporate scandals like Polly Peck (UK), BBCI (UK), British & 
Commonwealth (UK), Maxwell (UK), Mirror Group (UK), Enron (US), World 
Com  (US),  Holzmann  (Germany),  Metallgesellschaft  (Germany),  Bayerische 
Hypo- und Vereinsbank (Germany) there have been increasing calls for more 
effective regulation of corporate behavior in general and the actions of company 
directors in particular. In response to that, various laws on issues of corporate 
governance have been passed in several countries around the world. In addition, 
in recent years there has been a strong trend towards the adoption of ‘soft law’ 
(Mörth,  2004)  or  ‘soft  regulation’  (Sahlin-Andersson,  2004)  in  the  form  of 
codes of corporate governance. A code of corporate governance can be defined 
generally as ‘a non-binding set of principles, standards or best practices, issued 
by a collective body and relating to the internal governance of corporations’ 
(Weil et al., 2003). The first serious code of this kind was the so-called Cadbury 
Report, which was issued in the UK in 1992 by a committee set up by the 
London Stock Exchange and the Financial Reporting Council.
1 It contained a 
set  of  rules  addressed  to  the  boards  of  directors  of  all  listed  companies 
registered  in  the  UK.  One  of  the  rules,  for  example,  stated:  ‘The  roles  of 
chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual’ 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992: A.2.1). While adherence to the individual rules of 
the code itself was voluntary, the listed companies were required by the Listing 
Rules to publicly ‘state in their report and accounts whether they comply with 
the  Code  and  identify  and  give  reasons  for  any  areas  of  non-compliance’ 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992: 17). Thus, the voluntary codes were combined with 
obligatory disclosure of the degree of compliance (‘comply-or-explain’ rule). 
 
The  Cadbury  code  as  a  mode  of  regulation  for  the  corporate  sector  was 
subsequently imitated by many countries around the world (Van den Berghe 
and De Ridder, 1999; Iskander and Chamlou, 2000; Weil and Manges, 2002; 
Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2004).  Up  to  now  similar  codes  have  been 
implemented more than fifty countries. These codes were variously issued by 
stock-exchange-related  bodies,  associations  of  directors,  various  types  of 
investor  groups,  business  and  industry  associations,  and  governmental 
commissions (Wymeersch, 2005). Most of them refer to companies listed on the 
respective national stock exchanges. Apart from these national initiatives there 
are also some transnational initiatives like the ‘OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance’, which are not so much directed at companies as such, but are 
primarily meant as ‘guidelines for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both 
OECD  and  non  OECD  countries’  (OECD,  2004:  3).  Other  transnational 
initiatives have not developed codes themselves, but propagate the development   2 
of national codes. Within the EU the use of governance codes as a mode of 
regulation  has  been  endorsed  by  the  High  Level  Group  of  Company  Law 
Experts. In their report to the European Union they write: 
 
Each Member State should designate one particular corporate governance 
code as the code with which companies subject to their jurisdiction have 
to comply or by reference to which they have to explain how and why 
their practices are different (Weil and Manges, 2002: 77). 
 
Thus, the national code initiatives ought to be regarded as embedded in a wider 
context  of  transnational  initiatives  that  both  call  for  codes  as  a  form  of 
regulation  and  partly  provide  guidelines  on  the  content  of  such  codes  (see 
Jacobsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). 
 
To the extent that the national codes of corporate governance refer to a domain 
that could also be regulated by national law, we can also speak of codes as a 
form  of  ‘regulated  regulation’  (Knill  and  Lehmkuhl,  2002)  or  ‘responsive 
regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). That is, the law has left a regulatory 
space for code initiatives which could, however, be replaced by legal directives. 
In the UK, for example, the Cadbury Committee and subsequent committees 
were set up privately because business law had left large areas of corporate 
practice unregulated. In Germany, by contrast, it was explicitly decided which 
areas of corporate practice to regulate by law and which ones by codes (Baums, 
2001). In this sense, the code initiatives are embedded in a legal framework that 
could take over part of the domain covered by the code. In Germany, one of the 
code  provisions  that  required  the  individual  disclosure  of  the  directors’ 
remuneration  was  recently  replaced  by  a  relevant  law  due  to  low  levels  of 
compliance with the code provision. 
 
In  view  of  the  pervasiveness  of  codes  of  corporate  governance  and  the 
propagation of code regulation by transnational actors there is surprisingly little 
research on their underlying mechanisms. Our understanding of the dynamics of 
soft regulation in general is still rather limited, since it is only in the last few 
years that it has been made a prominent point on the regulatory research agenda 
(e.g. Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Mörth, 2004; Kerwer, 2005; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). On codes of corporate governance in particular there 
is hardly any research. There are merely some generally descriptive studies of 
corporate governance code compliance (e.g. Pellens et al., 2001; Oser et al., 
2003; Von Werder et al., 2003; Von Werder et al., 2004; Von Werder et al., 
2005), as well as comparisons of different code contents (Weil and Manges, 
2002; Weil and Manges, 2003) and analyses of the rationale for the adoption of   3 
code regulation by nation states (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cacurra, 2004; Cuervo-
Cacurra  and  Aguilera,  2004).  However,  in  order  to  understand  the  code 
mechanism  we  need  to  go  beyond  analyses  of  individual  elements  of  code 
regulation and study the interactions between its different elements; we need to 
approach code regulation as a ‘regime’, as a dynamic system of interrelated 
parts. In this paper we will take a first step towards developing a framework for 
such an analysis. 
 
The argument will proceed as follows: in the first section we will describe the 
particularities of corporate governance codes and how code regulation is meant 
to  function.  Drawing  on  observation  theory,  in  the  second  section  we  will 
develop  a  theoretical  perspective  for  studying  code  regimes  in  practice. 
According to this view, codes of corporate governance are conceptualized as 
schemas of observation. In the third section we will argue that the introduction 
of codes establishes an observational field of mutual observations. Depending 
on the particular constellation of mutual observations between the observers in 
the field, codes might become institutionalized as observational schemas. In the 
fourth  section  we  will  distinguish  different  types  of  code  provisions 
representing different types of observational schemas. We will show how all of 
these schemas are in some way or other incomplete. These incompletenesses are 
filled by coupling to other observational schemas. Depending on the particular 
schemas that it connects to the code has different effects. We conclude with a 
brief  reflection  on  the  contribution  of  the  paper  and  provide  some  rough 
guidelines for empirical research on the basis of this framework. 
 
 
1. The basic ideas behind code regulation – the normative model 
 
In comparison with directives, codes of corporate governance are characterized 
by five points: (1) they are formally voluntary, (2) they are issued by ‘experts’ 
describing ‘best practice’, (3) they are designed to be applied flexibly, (4) they 
build on the market mechanism for evaluating deviations and for enforcing the 
code and (5) they are evolutionary in nature. In the following we will elaborate 
on each of these points. 
 
First,  the  individual  code  provisions  contained  in  the  code  are  not  formally 
binding. The official commentary to the German Cromme Code, for example, 
says  explicitly:  ‘The  code  itself  refers  to  the  code  provisions  […]  as  non-
binding. If companies wish to deviate from the code provisions […] they may 
do  that’  (Ringleb  et  al.,  2004,  my  translation).  This  voluntariness  provides 
legitimacy to the code issuer (e.g. Ringleb et al., 2004: 51–65). Code issuers are   4 
usually  not  democratically  elected  and  thus  cannot  claim  any  democratic 
legitimacy. Instead, they emphasize the voluntariness of the code, arguing that 
anyone can issue rules as long as they are not binding. This is in line with other 
research on soft regulation, which observes that in the absence of a democratic 
decision process, by which rules are introduced, formal voluntariness serves as 
a principal argument for their legitimacy (Brunsson, 2000); or put differently, 
‘without coercion, there is no authority in need of legitimacy’ (Kerwer, 2005: 
620).
2  While the code provisions themselves are formally voluntary, they are 
sometimes (not always) combined with a requirement for obligatory disclosure 
of the level of compliance (‘comply or explain’). That is to say, companies are 
formally  obliged  to  disclose  any  deviations  from  the  code  provisions.  This 
coercive element, however, is usually separately legitimized. In Germany, for 
example,  the  so  called  ‘comply-or-explain’  rule  was  passed  by  the  German 
parliament and incorporated into the German Stock Corporation Act (§ 161), 
whereas  in  other  countries,  e.g.  the  UK,  the  ‘comply-or-explain’  rule  is 
incorporated in the listing requirements. 
 
Second,  codes  are  usually  issued  by  committees  that  claim  particular 
‘expertise’. In contrast to other areas of soft law the claim of expertise does not 
rest primarily on scientific knowledge (Jacobsson, 2000; Jacobsson and Sahlin-
Andersson, 2006) but on practical experience. Code-issuing bodies are usually 
composed  predominantly  of  prominent  practitioners:  company  directors, 
institutional  investors,  shareholder  representatives,  lawyers,  accountants  etc. 
This practical expertise is typically symbolized by the chairpersons of the code 
committees.  In  the  UK  the  various  code  committees  were  chaired  by  well-
known businessmen, such as Sir Adrian Cadbury, Sir Ronald Hampel and Sir 
Derek  Higgs,  after  whom  the  respective  codes  were  named;  similarly,  in 
Germany  the  code  commission  was  chaired  by  the  widely  respected  former 
CEO of ThyssenKrupp, Dr. Gerhard Cromme. In line with the emphasis on 
practical  expertise,  codes  are  explicitly  meant  to  describe  so-called  ‘best 
practice’, which implies that they describe practices that have proven successful 
in  practice.  In  this  sense  these  codes  are  also  referred  to  as  ‘codes  of  best 
practice’. The original idea is that the practices of certain exemplary companies 
can be diffused throughout the corporate sector.
3 This reference to the expertise 
of  the  members  of  the  code  commission  and  the  description  of  the  code 
provisions as ‘best practice’ is generally seen as the primary means of raising 
the acceptance of the code amongst the addressees of the code (see Ringleb et 
al., 2004: 9–16. On soft regulation generally, see Jacobsson, 2000 and Kerwer, 
2005: 618). 
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Third,  codes  are  meant  to  be  applied  flexibly.  It  is  not  intended  that  all 
companies to which the code is addressed follow all code provisions. Rather, 
where individual rules do not fit the particular organizational setting, companies 
are expected to deviate. In contrast to the principle of voluntariness, the idea of 
flexibility refers to the possibility of deviation in cases where particularities of 
the  industry  or  the  company  oppose  the  application  of  the  code  provisions. 
Baums gives as examples: size; ownership structures, international ownership, 
and requirements of the capital markets of other countries (Baums, 2003: 7). In 
the  Combined  Code  it  says:  ‘[D]epartures  from  the  Code  should  not  be 
automatically treated as breaches’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2006: 7); put 
differently, this means that it is possible to conform to the code even when 
deviating from it. In the official commentary on the German Cromme Code, for 
example, it says: ‘Flexibility, as [one of the] guiding idea[s] of the code, is 
meant to prevent companies affected by the code from being corseted into too 
inflexible regulations. Companies should rather have the possibility of tailoring 
the  modalities  of  corporate  governance  to  their  individual  situations  and  of 
optimizing them with regard to efficiency criteria’ (Ringleb et al., 2004: 89; my 
translation).  This  flexibility  is  primarily  generated  through  the  ‘comply-or-
explain’ rule, which expects companies to deviate from unsuitable provisions 
and to provide an explanation for the deviation.
4 In the British Combined Code, 
for example, it says: ‘While it is expected that listed companies will comply 
with the Code’s provisions most of the time, it is recognised that departure from 
the provisions of the code may be justified in particular circumstances. Every 
company  must  review  each  provision  carefully  and  give  a  considered 
explanation  if  it  departs  from  the  Code  provisions’  (Financial  Reporting 
Council, 2006: 5). The flexibility of the code serves as a means of increasing the 
responsiveness  of  the  code  with  regard  to  the  differences  of  the  affected 
companies. This means that the differences do not have to be accounted for in 
the code provisions themselves, and that the complexity of the codes is thus 
reduced – even to the extent that some code committees issue code provisions 
that they know some companies cannot comply with. The Cadbury Committee, 
for  example,  writes  in  the  respective  code:  ‘The  Committee  recognises  that 
smaller listed companies may initially have difficulty in complying with some 
aspects of the code. […] The boards of smaller listed companies who cannot, 
for the time being, comply with parts of the Code should note that they may 
instead  give  their  reasons  for  non-compliance’  (Cadbury,  1992:  3.15).  In 
addition  to  that,  such  flexibility  allows  for  an  ‘authentic’  responsiveness 
towards  idiosyncrasies.  It  is  not  the  code  issuer  who  has  to  assess  the 
applicability of the code provisions on behalf of the affected companies – the 
companies assess it for themselves from within the concrete situation. In this   6 
way, flexibility provides in principle the possibility of an authentic assessment 
of the situation. 
 
Fourth,  regulation  by  a  code  builds  on  the  market  mechanism,  which  is 
supposed  to  serve  two  functions:  evaluation  of  possible  deviations  and 
enforcement of the code as such. Whether or not a deviation from the code by a 
specific company is justified and how significant unjustified deviations are, is 
meant to be evaluated by the members of the capital market, who are also the 
ones the code is meant to protect primarily.
5 In the Combined Code it says: ‘It is 
for  shareholders  and  others  to  evaluate  the  company’s  statement’  (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2006: 4). Similarly, Baums writes about the German code: 
‘It is left to the capital market to evaluate the equivalence of any deviations [to 
the code provisions]’ (Baums, 2001: 10). As in the case of the third principle 
discussed  above,  here  too,  the  evaluation  by  those  affected  means  that  no 
particular institutional arrangements have to be made for this purpose. It thus 
reduces  the  complexity  of  the  regulatory  design.  Additionally,  it  allows  in 
principle  for  an  authentic  evaluation  by  those  affected  by  the  deviations,  as 
opposed to an evaluation carried out by external institutions on behalf of the 
affected parties.  
 
An  additional  function  of  the  integration  of  the  market  mechanism  is  the 
enforcement  of  code  compliance  by  those  affected  by  potential  deviations. 
Unjustified deviations from the code provisions are expected to be ‘sanctioned’ 
through negative share-price reactions. As Schüppen writes: ‘The influence of 
compliance on the share price is the idea behind the [comply-or-explain rule]’ 
(Schüppen, 2002: 1273; my translation). It is assumed that shareholders will 
take the level of compliance into consideration when they make a decision to 
buy,  sell,  hold,  or  vote.  Accordingly,  unjustified  deviations  from  code 
provisions that appear significant to shareholders are expected to result in lower 
share prices (Weil and Manges, 2002: 68–69). In this context researchers often 
cite  the  study  by  McKinsey  and  Company  (2002),  which  found  that  fund 
managers were prepared to pay an average premium of 14% for well-governed 
European and North American companies and even more in emerging markets. 
Since company directors are interested in high share prices, this mechanism is 
assumed to work as an enforcement mechanism (for similar studies see e.g. 
Gompers et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2004). As in the two previous points, here 
too the integration of the capital market reduces the complexity of the design of 
the code system, since no separate enforcement mechanism has to be set up. 
   7 
Revision of the 





Provides suggestions of 
guidelines for assessing 
‘good’ corporate 
governance 
Buy, hold or sell shares on the 
basis of their evaluation of the 
level of compliance 
Provide information on the level of 




National and international 
developments 
Fifth, codes are evolutionary by their very nature. They are meant to be revised 
on  a  continuous  basis  in  the  light  of  current  developments.  In  the  Cadbury 
Code, for example, it says explicitly: ‘It is essential […] that the Code […] is 
kept  up  to  date’  (Cadbury,  1992:  3.11).  Code  initiatives  are  consequently 
designed in such a way that they allow for a continuous development of the 
code  content.  This  means  that  changes  to  the  code  are  normally  fast  and 
unbureaucratic procedures, in contrast to laws, whose ‘adaptation to changed 
circumstances  is  mostly  cumbersome  and  leads  to  negative  delays’  (Baums, 
2001: 1; my translation; see also Ringleb et al., 2004: 1645). In accordance with 
this idea, some countries, such as Germany, have a standing committee that 
regularly  reviews  the  code  in  the  light  of  national  and  international 
developments in corporate governance (Wymeersch, 2005). 
 
 Although we described the five features of the code system separately above, 
they very much build on each other. Code issuers assume a particular system of 
interrelations between different actors, which we have reconstructed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The assumed mechanism of the code system 
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 At  the  top  of  the  code  regime  is  the  code  issuer,  who  provides  the  capital 
market with suggestions for assessing ‘good’ corporate governance in the form 
of the code. By reference to its expertise it tries to convince the capital market 
to accept the code as useful guidelines of ‘good’ governance. Only if the code is 
accepted can it become effective. This is the first hurdle the code regime has to 
overcome. After that, the main mechanism of the code regime is the feedback 
loop between the company and the shareholders. The shareholder is expected to 
assess the company’s displayed compliance  with the code and on that basis 
make his or her decision on buying, holding or selling company stocks. The 
directors of the company, on the other hand, are aware that their compliance 
rate  affects  the  shareholders’ decisions and,  thus,  ultimately  the  share  price. 
Because of that, directors will try to comply with the code and only deviate if 
they can provide justifications. 
 
So far we have examined the normative model of the code regime describing 
how it is meant to function. In order to assess how the code regime functions in 




2. Codes of corporate governance as schemas of observation 
 
In order to develop a conceptual approach for studying the code regime it is 
probably useful to take the code itself as a starting point, since it is the code 
around  which  the  entire  system  is  built.  In  its  most  basic  sense  a  code  of 
governance can be conceptualized as a schema of observation – in the sense that 
it provides distinctions for assessing the corporate governance of companies. 
Taking this as a starting point we can proceed to observation theory, according 
to which we would also conceptualize the actors involved as observers and their 
interactions as mutual observations. The concept of observation as a unit of 
analysis has the advantage that it is so basic that (almost) all social phenomena 
can be described as a result of it. In this sense the concept of observation is 
more basic than that of ‘norm’ or ‘institution’ (Spencer Brown, 1979). 
 
The theory of observation does not constitute a clearly defined field of research; 
it  is  rather  a  loosely  bound  complex  of  theoretical  strands.  Regarding  our 
research  question  there  is  one  strand,  exemplified  by  the  works  of  George 
Spencer Brown (1969), Heinz von Foerster (1981) and Niklas Luhmann (2002), 
that seems particularly promising. The central idea of all three authors is that 
every observation is based on a distinction that creates the object of observation. 
In other words, every observation is a construction that is based on a particular   9 
distinction;  depending  on  his  or  her  distinctions,  the  observer  observes  the 
world  differently.  Codes  of  corporate  governance,  in  this  sense,  can  be 
conceptualized as observational distinctions that create a particular reality for 
the observers using them for observing the governance of corporations. These 
schemas  of  observation  make  the  observer  see  something  as  relevant  to 
corporate  governance  which  otherwise  would  not  be  observed  as  such.  Put 
differently, it is the observational schema that makes something ‘a difference 
that  makes  a  difference’  (Bateson,  1972:  315).  For  example,  the  German 
Cromme Code (Cromme Code: 5.4.6) distinguishes between staggered and non-
staggered boards (i.e. re-election of members at different dates and for different 
periods of office), suggesting that under normal circumstances staggered boards 
represent  better  corporate  governance.  Before  the  code  came  into  effect, 
staggered boards were not an issue; this was a difference that did not make a 
difference in the assessment of corporate governance. Interestingly enough, in 
other countries the same difference makes the opposite difference, so to speak, 
in  the  sense  that  staggered  boards  are  considered  bad  practice.  This  brief 
example  should  make  clear  that  it  is  the  particular  distinctions  used  that 
determine what we observe as (good) corporate governance. 
 
In the context of this observation-theoretical approach, code regimes can be 
conceptualized as networks of interrelated observers that observe each other on 
the basis of the codes. Thus, in order to study a code regime one has to identify 
the different observers involved, analyze which observer is observing which 
other observers, examine the particular observational schemas contained in the 
code, and, finally, analyze how the code is complemented by, or competes with, 
other  observational  schemas  (e.g.  financial  performance  indicators).  In  the 
following section we will start off with an analysis of the interplay between the 
different observers involved in the code regime. 
 
 
3. The code as creating a field of mutual observations 
 
The functioning of a code of corporate governance depends on the dynamic 
interaction  of  many  different  actors.  Already  the  normative  model  that  we 
reconstructed above addressed the interplay between the individual corporation 
and its shareholders. However, beyond that there is a wide set of other actors 
that are of relevance if one wants to study the functioning of such a regulation 
mechanism (Engwall, 2006). In order to account for that, we suggest that codes 
be conceived as constituting a ‘field’ of interaction of many different players 
(Hedmo et al., 2006, speak in a similar context of a ‘regulatory field’). This 
field is made up of all actors that interact with each other with regard to the   10 
code; in this sense one could speak of an issue-based field (Hoffman, 1999). On 
the  basis  of  our  observation-theoretical  approach  this  field  can  be 
conceptualized as an observational field which consists of all actors (observers) 
that  use  the  code  as  a  schema  in  their  mutual  observations.  This  field  is 
essentially dynamic: first, the boundaries of the field are open to new observers 
entering it. This is the case when actors start using the codes as schemas of 
observation  and  are  themselves  being  observed  on  that  basis.  For  example, 
rating  agencies  might  start  using  the  codes  in  their  credit  ratings.  However, 
actors might also leave the field, which would be the case if they stopped using 
the  code  as  an  observational  schema  and  were  themselves  no  longer  being 
observed  on  that  basis.  For  example,  when  the  Cromme  Code  was  first 
introduced in Germany a lot of consultants entered the field offering general 
advice on the implementation of the code, most of whom have left the scene in 
the  meantime.  Second,  the  way  in  which  the  codes  are  used  in  the  mutual 
observations changes over time as new observers enter or leave the field and as 
other  schemas  of  observation  are  introduced.  In  addition  to  that,  the 
recursiveness of observations between the observers possesses itself a dynamic 
element which might lead to changes in the use of the codes. 
 
For  a  code  to  become  effective  it  is  necessary  that  an  observational  field 
develops  around  it.  Company  directors  have  to  observe  that  they  are  being 
observed on that basis. Without this observational loop the chances of the code 
being taken into account by the directors are relatively small. Initially, such a 
code  is  just  one  observational  schema  on  offer,  which  competes  with  many 
other observational schemas on corporate governance; there are, for example, 
numerous books describing how good governance or other potential codes of 
governance  are  supposed  to  be  structured:  in  some  countries  there  are 
competing  codes  of  Corporate  Governance;  in  Germany,  for  example,  there 
were  initially  the  ‘German  Code  of  Corporate  Governance‘  by  the  Berliner 
Initiativkreis  (2000)  and  also  the  ‘Frankfurter  Grundsätze’  by  the 
Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance (2000), until the Cromme Code 
came into effect. These offers have to be taken up if they are to have an effect. 
Beyond that, it is necessary that this observation be coupled with decisions that 
are considered relevant by the directors. The normative model, for example, 
assumes that the level of compliance will influence the shareholders’ decisions 
on  buying,  holding  and  selling  shares.  Apart  from  that,  there  are  also  other 
decisions on which it could have an influence, e.g. the granting of loans, or 
juridical  decisions  about  liability  claims  due  to  negligence  (Birkner  and 
Hasenauer, 2004). 
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We  may  distinguish  between  primary  and  secondary  reasons  (or  better: 
observations) for using a code as a schema of observation. Primary reasons 
have to do with the content of the code itself. Actors might use a code because 
they have analyzed the individual code provisions and they appear justified to 
them. This may be either because the observer is convinced of the usefulness of 
the  particular  code  provisions  as  such,  or  because  the  observer  has  found 
substantiations for them – either while discussing the issue with other observers, 
or in other texts (e.g. the Baums Report of 2001 explained why it suggested 
particular code provisions or other texts which dealt with corporate governance 
rules). Secondary reasons, in contrast, have to do with the observation of other 
actors  in  the  field.  First,  one  might  observe  that  the  code  issuers  describe 
themselves, and are described by others, as ‘experts’ on corporate governance. 
Hence one might consider the code to represent expert knowledge that can be 
accepted  without  further  examination  (Jacobsson,  2000).  Second,  one  might 
observe that other actors in the field are using the code as an observational 
schema  –  for  example  other  shareholders,  analysts,  lawyers.  This  might 
motivate one to use the code oneself: (1) if other actors who are considered 
sophisticated  (e.g.  analysts)  are  using  the  code  one  might  take  this  as 
confirmation  of  the  quality  of  the  code;  (2)  if  actors  who  are  generally 
considered  successful  are  seen  to  be  using  the  code,  one  might  imitate  this 
behavior in order to partake in this success; (3) the fact that other actors are 
using  the  code  might  have  concrete  effects  on  companies  (e.g.  reactions  to 
company share prices, or the risk of being held liable for particular behaviors). 
This in turn might make it sensible for other observers to use the code as a 
schema  of  observation.  These  second  types  of  secondary  reasons,  i.e.  the 
observation of others using the code, might result in a self-reinforcing cycle: the 
use of the code leads to further use of the code. We could also speak of a 
process of institutionalization in the sense of a ‘self-activating social process’ 
(Jepperson,  1991:  145).  In  the  following  we  want  to  look  at  potential  self-
activating mechanisms in more detail. For this purpose we want to focus on 
three exemplary self-reinforcing cycles of mutual observation. 
 
(1) Mutual observations between shareholders 
 
Mutual observations amongst shareholders provide a particularly conspicuous 
basis for self-reinforcing cycles of code use. If shareholders observe that other 
(‘successful’)  shareholders  use  the  code  to  assess  the  governance  of 
corporations they too might follow this practice. The fact that their peers use the 
code  might  serve  as  motivation  to  use  the  code  themselves.  There  are  two 
potential reasons for this. First, the effects of different governance practices on 
company performance are (at least to date) unclear. For the investor who has to   12 
make an investment decision this constitutes an area of uncertainty, in the sense 
that the relation between means and ends is not clear (March and Olsen, 1976). 
Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell’s concept of mimetic isomorphism (1991) 
one would expect that if successful shareholders are seen to be using the code to 
assess a company, other investors are likely to perceive the code as a solution to 
their assessment problem. This is supported by the literature on herd behavior 
amongst analysts (Welch, 2000; Phillips and Zuckermann, 2001; Rao et al., 
2001).  The  second  potential  reason  is  the  classic  rationalistic  one  that  has 
already been described by Keynes (1936). According to Keynes, investors judge 
assets on the basis of how they think other investors might judge them (and of 
their belief that others judge them in a particular way, who in their turn believe 
that others judge them … and so on), since the share price is ultimately just a 
reflection of such beliefs. Applied to our specific context, this implies that if 
shareholders see (a substantial number of) other shareholders use the code in 
their  investment  decisions  they  can  expect  code  compliance  to  have  an 
influence on the share price. Under such circumstances it would be rational to 
base one’s own investment decision on the code as well. 
 
Apart  from  that,  shareholders  might  observe  observation  intermediaries,  i.e. 
observers who observe organizations on behalf of other actors; e.g. analysts, 
shareholder associations, corporate governance rating agencies. These groups 
are particularly important not least due to the salience of their observations. 
Because  of  that,  one  would  expect  their  use  of  the  code  –  codes  are  often 
explicitly addressed to such intermediaries (see e.g. Ringleb et al., 2004: 351) – 
to have a particular influence on the tendency of investors either to use the code 
themselves or to rely on the results of the observations of the intermediaries (i.e. 
an indirect use of the code). Particularly influential in this respect might be the 
publication  of  so-called  ‘turkey-lists’  or  ‘black-lists’,  in  which  observational 
intermediaries put down the names of companies with bad compliance rates. In 
addition  to  that,  there  are  also  so-called  ‘Corporate  Governance  Quality 
Awards’, which are handed out to the companies with the best compliance rates.  
 
These  intermediaries  combine  several  of  the  aspects  that  we  have  already 
referred  to  above.  They  present  themselves  as  ‘experts’  in  the  field,  which 
means that their use of the code would enhance the code’s legitimacy. As a 
secondary result of that, such intermediaries are likely to be imitated, especially 
where uncertainty prevails, as in the situation described further up. And finally, 
given the potential of intermediaries to influence the way investors evaluate a 
corporation, and thus indirectly affect the share price (see the Keynes argument 
above), it would be rational for shareholders to orient their own judgment to the 
evaluations of those intermediaries. To spell out the self-reinforcing cycle: if   13 
intermediaries  observe  shareholders  using  the  code  in  their  investment 
decisions, they might themselves use the code to assess the resulting share price 
reactions, which then again might be observed by other shareholders leading 
them also to use the code; which again is observed by the intermediaries and so 
on. 
 
(2) Mutual observations between companies and their external observers 
 
A further central group of observers comprises the focal companies that are – or 
are not – assessed on the basis of the code. As outlined in the normative model 
above,  companies  are  assumed  to  observe  that  they  are  being  evaluated  by 
shareholders  on  the  basis  of  the  code.  To  the  extent  that  this  is  the  case, 
corporations inevitably fear negative consequences on their share price if they 
deviate without justification from code provisions. Apart from the shareholders 
themselves, they might observe the observation intermediaries (e.g. analysts). 
As already pointed out above, such codes are often explicitly meant to be used 
by intermediaries. Companies may also observe that the use of the code by 
intermediaries  increases  the  likelihood  that  shareholders  will  use  it,  as  they 
might observe the described self-reinforcing cycle of code usage by investors 
and intermediaries. 
 
Besides  the  observers  that  the  code  itself  mentions,  there  are  the  ‘other 
stakeholders’ or the ‘general public’. Although the general public is unlikely to 
take a direct interest in compliance rates, the reports of intermediaries, like the 
shareholder associations, might catch its attention. A prominent example of this 
was the public debate on the deviation of several DAX-30 companies from the 
recommendation  to  disclose  the  compensation  components  of  the  individual 
board members. Shareholder associations stated explicitly that they ‘use’ the 
mass media strategically in order to put such issues on the public agenda. For 
companies, this might have negative effects on their reputation with possible 
implications for their sales figures (particularly in the case of banks and similar 
companies where trust plays a special role), their share price, the value of the 
directors on the market for managers, the attractiveness of the company as an 
employer and so on. 
 
Since the external observers’ assessment of a company is also to some extent 
relative to the assessment of other companies, the companies are likely not only 
to observe their external observers but also the compliance rates of their peers. 
That is to say, if companies observe that the majority of other companies do not 
comply with a particular code provision, the external observers are less likely to 
expect compliance on this particular point and will consequently be less critical   14 
of the particular deviation – and vice versa. Hence the self-reinforcing cycle: the 
more companies comply with the code, the more will the external observers 
expect compliance, and the more companies will be motivated to comply. But 
this also works the other way around: the fewer companies comply, the less will 
the external observers expect compliance, and the less will other companies be 
motivated to comply. 
 
(3) Mutual observations between companies and lawyers 
 
A further important group of external observers that we have not discussed yet 
are company lawyers. They might combine the observational schemas of the 
corporate  governance  code  with  legal  schemas  on  due  diligence  in  liability 
claims. Wymeersch writes: ‘As with other soft law instruments, the legal system 
has  a  tendency  to  incorporate  the  standards  of  the  codes  as  the  normal 
benchmark against which conduct in a specific case will be measured. In terms 
of liability, of interpretation of contract clauses, and so on, it does not seem 
unlikely that the rules as adopted in the code will be considered the standard’ 
(Wymeersch, 2005: 418. See also Birkner and Hasenauer, 2004; Kieser et al., 
2002). Some representatives of shareholder associations have indicated that they 
intend  to  use  the  code  in  this  way.  In  that  case,  if  companies  are  not  in 
compliance  with  the  code  provisions,  they  might  have  to  prove  that  their 
deviating practice is at least as good; in other words, this might lead to a shifting 
of the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the prosecuted company. The use 
of the code in this legal context may be justified on the basis of two secondary 
reasons (i.e. secondary observations): first, company lawyers might observe the 
code issuers as ‘experts’ on corporate governance and, hence, the code as the 
outcome  of  ‘expert’  judgment  on  ‘best  practice’  of  corporate  governance 
(Ringleb  et  al.,  2004:  1624).  The  second  justification  is  based  on  the 
observation of other companies. If a large number of companies comply with 
the code, lawyers may justify the use of the code by referring to it as ‘common 
practice’  amongst  corporations  (Ringleb  et  al.,  2004:  1625).  Companies 
observing that lawyers use such codes in this way might comply with those 
codes in order to lower the risk of liability claims. This might set off a self-
reinforcing  cycle  where  companies  comply  with  the  code  in  order  to  avoid 
liability claims, and lawyers use the fact that a majority of companies comply 
with  the  code  as  a  basis  for  liability  claims,  which  motivates  companies  to 
comply with the code, and so on. 
 
With  these  three  examples  we  have  tried  to  show  the  potential  for  an 
institutionalization  process.  Whether  or  not  these  self-reinforcing  cycles  are 
started  and,  if  started,  how  strong  the  self-reinforcing  element  would  be  or   15 
whether it would be counteracted by other forces, is an empirical question that 
has to be analyzed in each individual case. Apart from that, the observational 
field is a dynamic one with new observers constantly entering or exiting it and 
various observational schemas being introduced or eliminated. Because of that, 
such cycles have to be studied in the context of the development of the field; 
they might start at some point and end at a different point. In the following we 
shall take a closer look at the types of observational schemas contained within 
the code and their relation to other schemas of observation existing in the field. 
 
 
4. Codes of corporate governance in the ecology of observational schemas 
 
With regard to codes of corporate governance we can distinguish three types of 
observational schemas. We will illustrate them with examples from the German 
Cromme  Code.  The  first  one  refers  to  the  disclosure  or  non-disclosure  of 
particular information. Sometimes this is just to inform the shareholder, e.g. by 
means of the publication of a ‘financial calendar’ (Cromme Code: 6.7). In most 
cases,  however,  this  is  meant  to  provide  the  external  observer  with  an 
informational basis for evaluating the company. For example: ‘Compensation of 
the members of the management board shall be reported in the Notes of the 
Consolidated Financial Statements subdivided according to fixed, performance-
related  and  long-term  incentive  components.  The  figures  shall  be 
individualized’ (Cromme Code: 4.2.4) or ‘In its report, the Supervisory Board 
shall inform the General Meeting of any conflicts of interest that have occurred 
together with their treatment’ (Cromme Code: 5.5.3). The suggested schema of 
observation here is merely concerned with whether the relevant information is 
disclosed or not. 
 
The second type of observational schema refers to the application of particular 
(abstract)  procedures  without  specification  of  their  concrete  content.  For 
example,  
‘An  age  limit  for  members  of  the  management  board  shall  be  specified’ 
(Cromme Code: 5.1.2). The observational distinction here is whether or not a 
particular procedure is put in place, i.e. whether or not an age limit has been 
decided upon. However, the question of a specific age limit is not addressed. 
 
The  third  type  of  observational  schema  refers  to  the  appropriateness  of 
particular practices or structures. For example, ‘The Management Board shall 
be comprised of several persons’ (Cromme Code: 4.2.1); or ‘[The Chairman of 
the  Supervisory  Board]  should  not  be  Chairman  of  the  Audit  Committee’ 
(Cromme Code: 5.2). In contrast to the previous type of code provision, this one   16 
addresses the content of the structure or procedure, i.e. not only the selection 
process but what should or should not be selected. 
 
All  three  types  of  observational  schemas  are  not  self-sufficient.  They  are 
‘incomplete’ in that they tend to call for additional observational schemas to 
complement them. This is most obvious in the case of the first two types of code 
provisions. In the first case, the provided information in most cases calls for 
further analysis according to a different schema. In the example above, the code 
provision concerned with the disclosure of management compensation does not 
say  anything  about  the  appropriateness  of  the  level  and  structure  of  the 
disclosed  compensation.  However,  it  is  the  level  and  nature  of  the 
compensation, not the disclosure as such, that was the issue in devising this 
provision (in contrast, for example, to code provisions requiring the publication 
of the ‘financial calendar’, where it is the publication of the dates themselves 
that is of relevance; it is not a question of whether these are good or bad dates). 
Thus, both for the external observer and for the corporation itself this particular 
type  of  code  provision  on  its  own  does  not  allow  the  assessment  of  the 
appropriateness of the particular practice or structure. 
 
A similar kind of incompleteness is connected with the second type of code 
provisions.  Here  the  code  provision  addresses  the  intended  issue,  as  in  the 
example above: age makes a difference, but a further distinction is required to 
specify the particular content of the provision. The question here is: what age 
limit does make the difference? Hence, it is necessary to complement the code 
provision with further observational schemas distinguishing appropriate from 
inappropriate  age  limits.  The  code  itself  neither  contains  these  additional 
schemas nor does it indicate where they can be found. 
 
In  addition  to  these  instances  of  incompleteness  we  want  to  point  out  three 
further ones which are fundamental to more or less all code provisions. The first 
one concerns the interpretation of the code: how are the code provisions to be 
interpreted – both generally and with regard to the individual organization in 
particular?  The  code  itself  does  not  contain  observational  schemas  for 
interpreting  the  code  or  for  distinguishing  ‘adequate’  from  ‘inadequate’ 
interpretations. This problem is not specific to codes but is inherent to any text. 
No  text  can  control  the  way  it  is  being  interpreted.  This  phenomenon  is 
generally known as ‘difference’ (Derrida, 1978; for an application to rules, see 
Derrida, 1994). Beyond this it has been noted that ‘soft laws’ are often left 
ambiguous by design (Sahlin-Andersson, 2004). An example of this is the code 
provision on the independence of the supervisory board in the Cromme Code, 
which requires that ‘the Supervisory Board shall include what it considers an   17 
adequate  number  of  independent  members’  (Cromme  Code,  2005:  5.4.1; 
emphasis added). Cromme, the Chairman of the code-issuing commission, said: 
‘[This  code  provision]  has  been  criticised  by  many  people  for  not  being 
particularly precise. […] I can tell you that this has been exactly our purpose: 
we wanted to choose a frame as broad as possible, a definition as broad as 
possible, which would allow the respective companies in their specific situation 
to find appropriate solutions with regard to the definition of independence and 
also the number [of independent directors]’ (speech at the Third Conference on 
the  German  Corporate  Governance  Code  in  Berlin,  2005;  my  translation; 
spoken version). Thus, in order to interpret the code provisions one has to rely 
again on schemas external to the code. 
 
The second fundamental incompleteness concerns the assessment of deviations 
from individual code provisions and the provided explanations for them. While 
codes explicitly speak of the possibility of justified deviations from individual 
code provisions, they do not specify in what cases deviations are justified. In 
other  words,  the  codes  do  not  include  a  schema  for  observing  justified,  as 
compared  to  unjustified,  deviations.  This  again  is  an  unavoidable 
incompleteness;  already  Kant  and  Wittgenstein  pointed  out  that  no  rule  can 
regulate (comprehensively) the exceptions from itself. This is also known as the 
‘paradox of rule and exception’ (Ortmann, 2003a). Thus, if a director wants to 
use the code provisions as an observational schema for assessing and devising 
his  or  her  company’s  governance  structures  this  director  will  have  to 
‘supplement’ the observational schemas of the code with additional schemas 
external to the code. Similarly, shareholders or other external observers need to 
use additional schemas for assessing whether or not a given explanation for the 
deviation is justified or not. And even if this has been decided and a deviation is 
perceived as unjustified, they need yet a further observational schema to assess 
how important the particular deviation is. In this respect the codes themselves 
do not distinguish between the relevance of different code provisions. It is more 
or less left open where the additional schemas might come from. 
 
The third fundamental incompleteness has to do with the compliance statement. 
The normative model of the code regime assumes that the external observers are 
informed  about  the  company’s  level  of  compliance  through  the  compliance 
statement.  The  code  itself,  however,  does  not  specify  any  schemas  (or 
procedures) for assessing the congruence between the stated compliance and the 
actual  structures  and  practices  in  the  corporation.  In  other  words,  the  code 
leaves it up to the observer to decide about the ‘accuracy’ of the statement of 
compliance. (For a summary of all the different types of incompleteness see 
Table 1.)   18 
Table 1: Summary of types of incompleteness 
 
Type of code provision  Incompleteness 
1. Provision requiring merely the 
disclosure of information 
No schemas for evaluating the disclosed 
information 
2. Provisions requiring a particular 
(abstract) procedure without specifying 
the content 
No schema for distinguishing appropriate 
from inappropriate content 
3. All code provisions  No schema for distinguishing appropriate 
from inappropriate interpretations of the 
code 
4. All code provisions (‘comply-or-
explain’ rule) 
No schema for evaluating deviations and 
the explanations provided for the 
deviations 
5. All code provisions  No schema for judging whether the 




For understanding the functioning of a code regime it is now important to study 
what happens to these instances of incompleteness. It makes a great difference 
what  other  observational  schemas  the  code  and  its  individual  provisions  are 
combined with. In other words, one needs to analyze the code in the wider 
context of other observational schemas and study its various relations to them. 
 
When new codes are issued they become embedded into networks of already 
existing observational schemas. Some of these schemas might form links with 
the code, completing some of its incomplete points, and in this way determining 
how it is used. At the same time the code might itself be used to complement 
other observational schemas. It might, for example, complement legal rules by 
serving as a benchmark for assessing liability claims (Wymeersch, 2005: 418). 
In addition to that, the code might stand in different relations of competition 
with  other  observational  schemas,  e.g.  alternative  schemas  for  assessing  the 
attractiveness of corporations for potential investors. Hence, one would expect 
that  through  the  introduction  of  the  code,  existing  schemas  are  variously 
modified, emphasized, or suppressed. In addition to the existing schemas the 
introduction of the code is also likely to give rise to new observational schemas, 
e.g. various commentaries on the code or schemas that allow the conversion of 
compliance rates into numerical figures – so-called scorecards (e.g. Strenger, 
2004).  These  existing  and  new  observational  schemas  are  undoubtedly 
influenced by the introduction of the code; however the code itself is influenced 
in its turn by these schemas. In order to account for the dynamic interaction 
between  these  observational  schemas  in  the  observational  field  we  can  also   19 
speak  of  an  ecology  of  observational  schemas  (see  Vickers,  1968;  Bateson, 
1972;  Seidl,  forthcoming).  Viewed  in  terms  of  ecology,  the  different 
observational schemas cannot be studied independently of each other. Rather, 
every observational schema is affected by other schemas and vice versa. With 
every new observational schema that is added or erased the ecology is changed. 
In the following we want to analyze some of the constellations formed by the 
code and other observational schemas. 
 
With regard to the various types of incompleteness of the code that we outlined 
above  we  can  distinguish  several  possible  developments.  First,  the  various 
actors who want to assess companies on the basis of the code might use their 
own observational schemas for completing the codes. However, to the extent 
that the code itself gets institutionalized, i.e. locked into self-reinforcing cycles, 
it  is  likely  that  a  particular  set  of  supplementary  schemas  becomes 
institutionalized  as  well  (see  Edelmann,  1992).  The  process  of 
institutionalization  might  be  embedded  in  the  way  the  actors  in  the 
observational field copy supplementary schemas that other actors use, or in the 
way some actors explicitly propose certain supplementary schemas, e.g. in the 
form of a commentary to the code (e.g. Ringleb, et al., 2004; Pfitzer and Oser, 
2003;  Hucke  and  Ammann,  2003;  Stock et  al.,  1999).  These  supplementary 
schemas might then become stabilized in the same self-reinforcing cycles that 
we described above. For example, with regard to the code provision requiring 
the supervisory board to have an ‘adequate number of independent members’, 
which  we  already  referred  to  above,  we  would  expect  various  actors  to  put 
forward  supplementary  schemas  that  define  what  an  ‘adequate  number’  and 
‘independence’ are. Depending on the particular supplementary schema chosen, 
the  board  would  consequently  be  considered  either  to  be  or  not  to  be 
independent, and thus the company to be, or not to be, in compliance with the 
code provision. Thus, the supplementary schema can have an extreme effect on 
what  is  being  observed  on  the  basis  of  the  code.  In  the  course  of  mutual 
observations some of the definitions might then become stabilized while others 
might disappear again. 
 
Second,  the  various  incomplete  elements  might  remain  so  because  they  go 
unnoticed  or  because  it  is  assumed  that  other  observers  will  complete  them 
instead. In some cases the original sense of incompleteness might get lost in the 
course of the mutual observations. In the first two cases of incompleteness, i.e. 
where  code  provisions  require  the  disclosure  of  particular  information  (e.g. 
disclosing  the  directors’  level  of  income)  or  where  they  require  a  particular 
abstract procedure without specifying its content (e.g. setting any age limit for 
directors), it might be that no supplementary schemas are used at all. The actors   20 
in the field might simply observe whether or not the information is provided and 
behave  as  if  this  were  the  actual  issue.  The  information  itself  might  not  be 
analyzed  any  further.  Similarly,  actors  might  simply  observe  whether  a 
particular procedure is put in place, regardless of the concrete content. In our 
example, they might check that an age limit is determined but not what age 
limit in particular. By leaving such points incomplete, the meaning of the code 
thus  shifts  from  a  particular  content  to  particular  (empty)  procedures  or 
structures (see Power, 1997). 
 
In some cases these original instances of incompleteness are obscured by the 
use of derivative schemas; that is, schemas that are derived from the code and 
are  used  as  a  substitute  for  the  code.  Such  substitutive  schemas  provide 
simplified versions of the code or transform the code into numbers. An example 
of  such  a  substitutive  schema  is  a  checklist,  which  transforms  the  code 
provisions into a list of yes-or-no questions. Although many actors in the field, 
particularly the code issuers, have warned against the ‘tick-box mentality’ such 
checklists are widely propagated – ironically even the official commentary on 
the Cromme Code contains itself a checklist in its appendix (Ringleb et al., 
2004:  351–367).    Another  substitutive  schema  is  the  so-called  corporate 
governance scorecard (e.g. DVFA, 2003; Strenger, 2004). Such scorecards are 
similar to checklists but they also calculate a score for corporate governance. 
This score is itself a derivative schema that might be taken as a substitute for the 
code; in other words, instead of evaluating a company’s corporate governance 
by going through the code, one might just be provided with a score prepared by 
somebody  else.  Another  potential  substitutive  schema  is  the  compliance 
statement that companies have to provide. That is, actors in the field might not 
use the code as such but only look at the compliance statement. Such a use of 
the compliance statement has variously been propagated: 
 
‘The compliance statement makes it possible for investors to assess 
without spending much time or money […] whether certain standards 
of good governance are met.’ (Seibt, 2002: 250; my translation) 
 
Such substitutive schemas tend to decrease awareness for the two original cases 
of incompleteness as the necessity of additional observational schemas does not 
show up anymore. For example, a score card result of 100 % or a compliance 
statement stating ‘full compliance’ seems to imply good governance. There is 
no indication that further observations are necessary to assess governance. 
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The fifth instance of incompleteness discussed above referred to the congruence 
between  the  compliance  statement  and  the  actual  structures  and  practices  in 
place in the focal corporation. The code itself does not provide any schemas (or 
procedures) for assessing such congruence. The problem with this point is also 
that  the  actual  structures  and  practices  are  often  shielded  from  external 
observation. In order to observe them one either has to enter the organization or 
try to gather information by different means (Wymeersch, 2005). While there 
are some actors who actively investigate the level of congruence, in most cases 
the  official  declaration  is  likely  to  be  taken  at  face  value.  Even  Baums, 
chairman  of  Government  Panel  on  Corporate  Governance,  writes:  ‘One  can 
presume the compliance statement by management board and supervisory board 
to be true’ (Baums, 2001: 12; my translation). The main reason for that is some 
kind of institutional trust (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1986). As long as 
the actors in the field observe that the entire system is functioning well on the 
whole, they assume that they can trust declarations to be correct on the whole. 
To the extent that directors are aware of this we can expect to find instances of 
‘creative compliance’ (McBarnet andWhelan, 1991) and decoupling between 
declared formal procedures and actual activities in the company (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). 
 
A particularly interesting instance of incompleteness concerns the ‘comply-or-
explain’  rule.  The  code  itself  does  not  provide  any  schemas  for  evaluating 
disclosed  deviations  and  the  relevant  explanations  offered.  The  normative 
model  described  above  assumes  that  shareholders  base  their  assessments  on 
their personal criteria. The problem, however, is that there is uncertainty about 
the effects of any deviations. As a consequence, external observers might just 
use a rule of thumb, by which they just count the number of deviations, with a 
high number representing a negative assessment and a low number a positive 
one. This form of evaluation can be widely observed: everyone speaks about the 
number of deviations as if they were all to be considered of equal importance 
(e.g. Von Werder et al., 2005). Individual explanations for deviations also tend 
not to receive much attention. Although they are easily accessible it might be 
difficult to evaluate whether a specific explanation is justified. This is likely to 
be the case especially for observers who are not familiar with the particular 
practices in a particular industry or market (e.g. foreign investors). Apart from 
that, the evaluation of explanations takes time and effort which some observers 
might  not  be  prepared  to  invest.  As  a  consequence,  deviations  might  be 
automatically  evaluated  negatively  without  the  relevant  explanations  being 
taken into account. This is more so when one uses substitutive schemas that do 
not allow the observation of explanations. Many checklists, for example, only 
distinguish between compliance and deviation. Because of that, justified and   22 
unjustified deviations would be observed in the same way. Many practitioners 
have warned against this tendency (e.g. Coombes and Wong, 2004); the code 
issuers themselves have tried to encourage people not to dismiss explanations 
without having looked at them first. In the British Combined Code, for example, 
it  says:  ‘Whilst  shareholders  have  every  right  to  challenge  companies’ 
explanations  if  they  are  unconvincing,  they  should  not  be  evaluated  in  a 
mechanistic  way  and  departures  from  the  Code  should  not  be  automatically 
treated as breaches’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2006: 7). However, even the 
code issuers often do not pay such explanations much attention. For example, 
the official commentary on the Cromme Code contains a checklist that does not 
distinguish between justified and unjustified deviations. Neither do the yearly 
‘official’ reports on the Cromme Code differentiate between them (Von Werder 
et al., 2003; Von Werder et al., 2004; Von Werder et al., 2005). Interestingly 
enough,  the  commentary  on  the  Cromme  Code  even  recommends  that  such 
explanations be not incorporated in the compliance statement but in a separate 
document,  the  so-called  corporate  governance  report  (Ringleb  et  al.,  2004: 
1556). Thus, external observers who only read the compliance statement cannot 
distinguish between explained and unexplained deviations. 
 
If  directors  observe  a  tendency  among  external  observers  not  to  take 
explanations into account, they are unlikely to make use of the ‘comply-or-
explain’ rule. Instead they will interpret their options as ‘comply or breach’ 
(Coombes  and  Wong,  2004),  which  removes  the  principle  of  flexibility,  on 
which the idea of the code is based. This might also be the reason why so many 
companies do not provide any explanations for their deviations (MacNeil and 
Li, 2005). An additional problem is that, even if the provided explanations were 
assessed by the external observers, the directors cannot be sure whether the 
explanations that appear justified to them would appear so also to the external 
observer. As MacNeil and Li (2005) write: ‘There remains the risk that the 
company’s assessment of this issue would not be the same as that of investors, 
not least because assessments of the costs of compliance are largely subjective’. 
Thus, companies that do not want to take any risks are likely to try to comply 
with as many code provisions as possible – even if they think they have justified 
reasons for deviating. 
  
The effect of codes on mutual observations, however, depends largely also on 
the  way  they  are  integrated  into  other  schemas.  For  example,  only  if  the 
shareholders perceive the code to make a difference to their financial interests 
will  they  react  towards  observed  non-compliance.  So  far,  however,  the 
relevance of good governance for financial performance has not been proved; 
the evidence for any connections between governance and performance is very   23 
mixed  (e.g.  Bassen  et  al.,  2006;  Bauer  et  al.,  2004;  Drobetz  et  al.,  2004). 
Another  example  is  the  integration  of  the  code  into  legal  schemas  of 
observation. If the code is perceived to define the care and diligence of the 
board, and is treated as such, legal observers will base their observations of 
corporations on the code. This might then be observed by the directors as a legal 
threat for non-compliance (Birkner and Hasenauer, 2004; Wymeersch, 2005). 
 
Apart  from  the  possible  integration  of  the  code  into  other  schemas  of 
observation one also needs to analyze the relation of the code to alternative or 
competing schemas. For example, how are compliance levels evaluated with 
relation  to  other  financial  performance  indicators?  Can  low  financial 
performance be compensated with a high compliance level and vice versa? Or is 
the compliance level irrelevant as long as the financial performance is positive? 
MacNeil and Li (2005) suggest that, on the basis of a survey of FTSE 100 serial 
non-compliers, in Britain there is a strong link between share price performance 
and investors’ tolerance of non-compliance with the Combined Code. In other 
words, as long as the share price is acceptable, investors are unlikely to take 
much  notice  of  any  deviations  from  the  code.  From  the  perspective  of  the 
directors this means that one might deviate from the code without having to fear 
any negative reaction as long as the company performs well. Thus, the ‘comply-
or-explain’ principle becomes a ‘comply-or-perform’ principle. 
 
To some extent the introduction of a code also leads to a crowding-out of other 
observational  schemas,  since  the  external  actors’  ‘time  and  capabilities  for 
attention  are  limited’  (March,  1994:  10).  This  crowding-out  is  particularly 
obvious in cases of similar observational schemas. For example, if there are 
several corporate governance codes around, people tend to use only one and 
disregard the other. But also observational schemas that are different to the ones 
included in the code might get crowded out if they lose out on the competition 
for  attention  (March,  1994).  This  crowding-out  tends  to  increase  as  a  code 
becomes increasingly institutionalized. The more people use a particular code 
and  the  less  they  refer  to  alternative  schemas  of  observation  (e.g.  the  less 
alternative  schemas  are  discussed  by  analysts)  the  less  will  other  people  be 
aware of those alternative schemas. The more people use substitutive schemas 
that do not show the content of the code – e.g. a corporate governance score or 
the compliance statement – the greater is this tendency likely to be. In these 
cases one cannot know whether particular schemas are included in the code or 
not. In addition to that, once  the code  dominates observation an element of 
social trust might set in: one trusts that all relevant elements are covered by the 
code,  because  otherwise  other  people  would  have  pointed  out  that  some 
elements were missing (Luhmann, 1992: 588–589). As a result, the code has a   24 
tendency to focus observation on those aspects that are  covered by it while 
obscuring aspects covered only by alternative schemas. 
 
With these examples of the ways in which a code might become integrated into 
the ecology of observation we have tried to show how the effect of such a code 
is determined by its relation to other schemas of observation. Depending on the 
way  in  which  the  code  is  related  to  other  schemas  it  results  in  different 
observations. Consequently, it also leads to different constellations of mutual 





In this paper we have tried to contribute to the understanding of code regimes as 
a  particular  form  for  regulating  organizations.  In  order  to  account  for  the 
dynamics involved in such regimes we have suggested that codes should be 
conceptualized as schemas of observation that mediate the mutual interactions 
between the various actors involved. To the extent that codes are actually used, 
an observational field is created around them; i.e. a field of observers, who in 
some way or other refer to the codes in their mutual observations. However, 
codes  are  themselves  only  determined  through  their  relation  to  other 
observational  schemas  around  them.  On  the  one  hand,  codes  require 
complementary schemas in order to become operative – in this respect we have 
identified several instances of incompleteness. On the other hand, other existing 
or emerging observational schemas might emphasize, suppress or subvert such 
codes as observational schemas. Hence, what and how the different observers 
observe on the basis of the codes depends on how these codes are combined 
with complementary schemas and compete with conflicting ones. To account 
for  the  dynamic  interrelation  between  such  schemas,  we  have  suggested  the 
concept of an ecology of observational schemas, in which the codes become 
embedded. 
 
On  the  basis  of  this  theoretical  framework  we  have  identified  several 
constellations between the various actors in the field that lead to self-reinforcing 
cycles of mutual observations. To the extent that codes are caught in such cycles 
they become institutionalized as observational schemas. However, whether or 
not code use is enforced in that way and what implications this has for the 
interaction between the observers depends on the particular circumstances. We 
have tried to demonstrate how the relation of the code to other observational 
schemas determines what observations the code allows for: (1) other schemas 
might  complement  a  code’s  incomplete  elements;  (2)  the  code’s  incomplete   25 
elements  might  remain  incomplete;  (3)  the  code  as  a  whole  might  become 
integrated into other schemas. 
 
The purpose of this framework is to provide guidelines for studying the effect of 
codes in their concrete settings. According to this framework an analysis of a 
particular code regime can be structured around the following questions: (1) 
what types of observational schemas does a code provide and what types of 
incompleteness do they entail? (2) who are the observers referring to the code? 
(3) are there any cycles of mutual observation in which the code is involved? (4) 
what other schemas of observation exist in the field? (5) how are these schemas 





1 In the USA and Hong Kong there were two precursors to this code in 1978 and 
1989 respectively. However, those codes were relatively general and did not 
receive much attention.  
2 As an additional means of legitimation, standard-setting committees are often 
composed of members representing the affected parties (Hommelhoff and 
Schwab, 2001; Baums, 2001: 16). 
3 The original notion of ‘best practice’ as best existing practice is, however, not 
always that clear in the code initiatives. 
4 It must be noted that there are different versions of the ‘comply-or-explain’ 
principle. While in Britain, for example, companies are obliged by the listing 
regulations to provide an explanation for their deviations, in Germany they are 
only obliged to state that they are not in compliance with the code – the rule is 
thus sometimes also referred to as ‘comply-or-disclose’. Nevertheless, even in 
the second case companies are expected by the code issuer to provide 
explanations out of self-interest.  
5 While the various codes mostly mention also other actors beyond the 
shareholders, the code regime is ultimately focused on the shareholder. This can 
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